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Rhetorical Hermeneutics

Steven Mailloux

The Space Act of 1958 begins, "The Congress hereby declares that it
the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devo
to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." In March 1982
Defense Department official commented on the statute: "We interp
the right to use space for peaceful purposes to include military use

space to promote peace in the world."' The absurdity of this wi

misinterpretation amazed me on first reading, and months later it re
came to mind when I was looking for an effective way to illustrate
politics of interpretation. With just the right touch of moral indigna
I offered my literary criticism class this example of militaristic ideo
blatantly misreading an antimilitaristic text.
"But ... the Defense Department is right!" objected the first stud
to speak. Somewhat amused, I spent the next ten minutes trying, w
decreasing amusement, to show this student that the Reagan admin
tration's reading was clearly, obviously, painfully wrong. I pointed t
text. I cited the traditional interpretation. I noted the class consens
which supported me. All to no avail. It was at this point that I felt
"theoretical urge": the overwhelming desire for a hermeneutic acco
to which I could appeal to prove my student wrong. What I wanted
a general theory of interpretation that could supply rules outlawing
student's misreading.
This little hermeneutic fable introduces the three topics of my es
One topic is the theoretical moment that concludes the narrative; ano

is the simple plot, a brief rhetorical exchange; and finally there's the institu
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setting (a university classroom) in which the exchange takes place. These
three topics preoccupy the sections that follow. Section 1 analyzes the
problems resulting from the theoretical urge, the impasse of contemporary

critical theory. Section 2 proposes my solution to this impasse, a solution
I call rhetorical hermeneutics, which leads in section 3 to a rhetorical
version of institutional history.

1

The theoretical urge is a recurrent phenomenon within the present
organization of American literary studies. For within that discipline, the
task of explicating individual texts remains the privileged activity; and,
historically, this primary task has always brought in its wake a secondary
one: critical practice inevitably leads to its self-conscious justification in
critical theory. Every time a new challenger to the critical orthodoxy

comes along, the discipline's theoretical discourse renews itself in an
attempt to provide a rationale for interpretation. In simplified form, the
institutional catechism during the last forty years has gone something
like this: What is the purpose of literary studies as an institutionalized

discipline? To produce knowledge about literature. How can this best
be accomplished? By doing explications of texts. What should be the
goal of explication? To discover the correct interpretation, the meaning
of the text.2 Once the theoretical dialogue gets this far, the agreement
among theorists begins breaking down. How can we guarantee that critics
produce correct interpretations? Formalists respond, "By focusing on the
text"; intentionalists, "By discovering the author's meaning"; reader-response critics, "By describing the ideal reader's experience"; and so on.
As dissimilar as these theoretical answers appear, they all share a
common assumption: validity in interpretation is guaranteed by establishing

norms or principles for explicating texts, and such rules are best derived
from an account of how interpretation works in general. In other words,
most traditional theorists assume that an accurate theoretical description
of interpreting will give us binding prescriptions for our critical practice,

prescriptions that can assure (or at least encourage) correct readings.
The classic statement of this assumption is E. D. Hirsch's in "Objective
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Interpretation": "When the critic clearly conceives what a correct

pretation is in principle, he possesses a guiding idea against wh
can measure his construction. Without such a guiding idea, self-c
or objective interpretation is hardly possible."3

In this way, contemporary literary theory comes to focus on a que

it takes as basic: How does interpretation-the accomplishment of
ing-take place? Two hermeneutic positions have developed in resp
to this central question: textual realism and readerly idealism. Herm

realism argues that meaning-full texts exist independent of interpreta

From this perspective, meanings are discovered, not created. The
of the text exist objectively, prior to any hermeneutic work by r
or critics, and therefore correct interpretations are those corresp
to the autonomous facts of the text. Realism often views the interp
mind as passive, simply acted upon by the words on the page. Th
the text must be read, in correct interpretation it speaks itself.

reader needs to do anything, it is only the mechanical activity of comb

word meanings into larger thematic units and formal relationship
is a "build-up" model of interpretation. For hermeneutic realism,
are the primary source and test of readings; they constrain and ult
determine interpretations.
In contrast, hermeneutic idealism argues that interpretation al

creates the signifying text, that meaning is made, not found. In this v
textual facts are never prior to or independent of the hermeneutic act

of readers and critics. Idealism claims not only that the interpreter
is active but that it is completely dominant over the text. There
semantic or formal givens; all such textual givens are products of
pretive categories. This is a "build-down" model of interpretation
this perspective, what counts as a correct reading depends entire
shared assumptions and strategies, not autonomous texts. In herm
idealism, a text doesn't constrain its interpretation; rather, comm
interpretation creates the text.
As theories of interpretation, textual realism and readerly id

share a common institutional concern: to establish a foundation for val-

idating knowledge. I call this an institutional concern because traditional
theorists claim that, without principles of correct interpretation, an institutionalized discipline has no way of grounding its production of new

knowledge. Once again Hirsch is the paradigmatic theorist: he claims

that, without a proper theory of correct interpretation, we cannot avoid
"subjectivism and relativism" and cannot think of "literary study as a
corporate enterprise and a progressive discipline."4 It follows from this
view that theory serves the corporate enterprise by making explicit the
norms and principles of valid readings. Any such theory attempts to
derive these norms and principles from its general account of how interpretation works. Whether the account is realist, idealist, or some combination of the two, it must provide an intersubjective ground for correct
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interpretation, and it is traditionally thought that only by establishing
such a ground can the dangers of relativism and subjectivism be avoided.
With such a high value placed on intersubjective foundations for
interpreting, it should come as no surprise that the concept of conventions
plays an important-even central-role in hermeneutic accounts, whether
realist or idealist.5 Thus, with some justification, the following discussion
takes the conventionalist version of the realist/idealist debate as a synecdoche for all "foundationalist" arguments in recent critical theory.
Theorists of the realist persuasion have long turned to textual conventions to explain literary interpretation. Formalists, intentionalists,
structuralists, and even some reader-response critics locate conventions
in a text in order to guarantee intersubjective foundations in their hermeneutic accounts. An especially interesting case of realist conventionalism
can be found in the work of Monroe Beardsley, who with W. K. Wimsatt
codified the prescriptions of New Critical formalism. In essays on the
affective and intentional fallacies, Wimsatt and Beardsley proposed an
"objective criticism" that would avoid the dangers of "impressionism,"
"skepticism," and "relativism."6 In his Aesthetics, Beardsley later developed
this formalism into a foundationalist theory, asking, "What are we doing
when we interpret literature, and how do we know that we are doing it
correctly?" and answering, "There are principles of explication for poetry
in terms of which disagreements about the correctness of proposed explications can be settled."7 These principles can be summed up in the
realist's slogan "Back to the text."8
Beardsley explains his realist hermeneutics further in The Possibility
of Criticism, where he argues that the "literary text, in the final analysis,
is the determiner of its meaning."9 At this point conventions enter into
Beardsley's account. In his chapter "The Testability of an Interpretation,"
he attempts to defend his formalist theory by arguing that "there really
is something in the poem that we are trying to dig out, though it is

elusive" (PC, p. 47). This "something"-the meaning in the text-is the
object of interpretation, and Beardsley proposes to define it more rigorously

by appropriating the conventionalism of speech-act theory. In another
place, Beardsley succinctly describes J. L. Austin's account of language
use: "To know what illocutionary action [requesting, promising, asserting,
and so on] was performed is to know what action the production of such
a text generated by the appropriate conventions."10
Austin's conventionalism can be pushed in two very different directions: toward readerly idealism, with conventions placed in hearers, or
toward textual realism, with conventions posited in texts. Predictably,
Beardsley's adaptation of speech-act theory takes the realist route. Rather
than having speakers or hearers "take responsibility" for performing
certain illocutionary acts and for committing themselves to certain conventional conditions (for example, in promising, that the speaker can do
a certain act in the future), Beardsley prefers to say that literary texts
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imitate illocutionary acts and-"represent" that certain conditions are
fact the case (PC, p. 115 n. 38). This is a shrewd maneuver: instea
readers taking responsibility for conventions of language use, texts r
resent those conventions; conventions move from outside to inside t

text. This realist placement of conventions gives Beardsleyjust what
formalist theory requires-an autonomous text against which all inte
pretations can be tested. "I am arguing that there are some features

the poem's meaning that are antecedent to, and independent of,

entertaining of an interpretive hypothesis; and this makes it possible
check such hypotheses against reality" (PC, pp. 57-58). And these sema
features that test interpretations include conventions embedded in
text.

Realist theories like Beardsley's emphasize that conventions display
shared practices for writing literature and that readers and critics must
recognize these textual conventions in order to achieve valid interpretations.

But such theories inevitably suffer from incomplete coverage and lack
of specificity as exhaustive accounts of interpreting. No matter how com
prehensive it tries to be, the realist conventionalism of genre critics,
formalists, and semioticians remains unsatisfying as a complete descriptio
of even a single text's literary meaning. The common notion of an artwork's

irreducible uniqueness refuses to go away, even when a significant portion
of the text's sense is attributable to an author following, modifying, o
rejecting traditional conventions. But perhaps the literary text's uniqueness

is simply an illusion fostered by the humanistic tradition, on the one
hand, and supported by the needs of a critical profession, on the other
Even if this were the case and a text's meaning really could be explained
as completely conventional, realist accounts would continue to be embarrassed by their contradictory descriptions of the uninterpreted given
in the text and by their many unconvincing explanations of how such
textual givens cause interpretations. Realist conventionalism only restate
these essentialist and causal problems: How exactly are conventions manifested in the text? How do such textually embedded conventions determine

interpretation? The latter question usually leads realists toward som
kind of correspondence model: interpreters recognize conventions in a
text because they have literary competence, an internalized set of interpretive conventions. 1 Realists who take this route move toward idealis
solutions and in so doing also move toward idealist incoherencies.
In contrast to realism, idealist theories emphasize conventions as
shared practices for interpreting literature, conventions present in readers
and critics, not in texts. Important idealist theories include those of Stanley

Fish in "Interpreting the Variorum" and Jonathan Culler in Structuralis
Poetics. Fish argues that communal interpretive strategies are the only

constraints on the production of meaning. Texts are products of in

terpretive communities, which "are made up of those who share interpretive

strategies not for reading ... but for writing texts, for constituting thei
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properties."'2 In Structuralist Poetics, Culler more fully elaborates an idealist-

oriented account of using conventions in interpretation. Though at times
he refers to "potential" properties "latent" in the text itself, he more often

emphasizes interpreters' reading conventions, which determine the sense
they make of the literary work.13 He talks of the poem offering a structure

for the reader to fill up, but he stresses the interpretive conventions
competent readers use to invent something to fill up that structure. He
suggests that it is not the text but the reading conventions that "make
possible invention and impose limits on it."14
While realist accounts posit textual conventions that are recognized
by readers, idealist accounts place interpretive conventions in readers
who then apply them to create meaningful texts. Idealists fare no better

than realists, however, in using conventions to avoid epistemological

embarrassment. True, they do avoid the realist problems connected with

essentialism and causation by arguing that the content of the text is
produced by the interpretive conventions employed and that texts do
not cause interpretations at all. But entirely new problems arise out of
these supposed solutions. The two most important involve the infinite
regress of conventions and the unformalizable nature of context. In a
particular case of interpretation, what determines the interpretive conventions to be used? Idealists cannot answer by proposing metaconventions,
because this would lead to an infinite regress within their theories: each
set of conventions at a lower level requires metaconventions at a higher
level to determine the appropriate lower-level conventions. Then these
metaconventions themselves need metaconventions, and so on. One way
to avoid this pitfall is to argue that context always determines the interpretive conventions to employ. But such a claim only leads to a more
difficult question for the idealist: What constrains the use of interpretive
conventions in a specific context?

Both Fish and Culler, among others, have recently suggested the

impossibility of adequately answering this question. As they fully realize,
such a suggestion entails a critique of their past conventionalist accounts
of interpretation. I will limit my discussion here to Culler's recent observation that the interpretive conventions on which he focused in Structuralist Poetics should be seen as part of a "boundless context."'5 Culler
states his new position in this way: "Meaning is context-bound, but context
is boundless" (OD, p. 123). Culler seems to be claiming two rather different
things, only the first of which helps explain why the contextual nature
of interpretation makes idealist conventionalism inadequate.
Culler first seems to be arguing that any full account of meaning
must include a notion of boundless context. By characterizing context
as boundless, Culler means that any hermeneutic theory trying to specify
a particular context exhaustively is doomed to failure: "Any given context
is always open to further description. There is no limit in principle to
what might be included in a given context, to what might be shown to
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be relevant to the interpretation of a particular speech act" ("CM," p.
24). Every specification is open to questions asking for further specif
cations.'6 In such an account, conventions are, at best, only first a
proximations of boundless context. Conventions begin the specificatio
of relevant contextual features, designating the relation of the words
persons, and circumstances required for a speech act to have the specif
meaning it has in a given context (compare OD, p. 121).
But conventions alone are inadequate as explanatory concepts. Either
the description of the conventions must reductively and arbitrarily lea
out relevant contextual features, or the specification of the relevant con
ventions would have to be so open-ended that conventions would becom
indistinguishable from context and lose their identity. A hermeneutic
theory using conventions in conjunction with other contextual featur
will fare no better as an exhaustive account of meaning since there is n
limit in principle to the features relevant to the interpretation of specif
speech acts. Another way of putting this is to say that context is unfo
malizable. Any account that uses "context" to constrain interpretation

thus has only two options: either it must simply name "context," "situation,

or "circumstances" as a constraint and not elaborate any further, or i
must carry out an infinite listing of all aspects of context and their in
terrelations, that is, bring everything in.'7 In other words, interpretiv
theories of context must either never begin the process of specification

or never end it.

Culler's first claim about boundless context agrees with what I have
been saying so far: boundless context determines meaning, and context

is boundless because it is ultimately not formalizable. Unfortunately,
Culler confuses things with a second, entirely different argument about
meaning and context, in which he asserts the "impossibility of ever saturating or limiting context so as to control or rigorously determine the
'true' meaning" ("CM," p. 28). In this deconstructionist claim, context is
boundless not in the first sense-that it is unformalizable-but in a
second sense: new contexts can always be imagined for a particular speech
act, and thus meaning is in principle radically indeterminate (see OD,
pp. 124, 128). Culler ends up using context here as an interpretive device
for making meaning undecidable rather than as an explanatory concept
in accounting for meaning's determinate shape.
Culler's two uses of context are not necessarily irreconcilable; but
to make them strictly consistent, he needs to give up his assertion about
the absolute indeterminacy of meaning. As it happens, doing this would
not be difficult given his initial explanatory use of "context." Indeed,
though he claims to be doing otherwise in his deconstructive maneuvers,
Culler actually demonstrates not that meaning is always indeterminate
but that meaning has one determinate shape in one situation and another
in a different situation. Though a speech act's meaning can change from
context to context, this meaning is always determinate within a given
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context. In the cases Culler suggests--situations in which the proposal of

an imagined context shows how a meaning could change-one of two
things happens: the meaning remains the same because, in the present
situation, the proposed context is perceived as imaginary; or the meaning
changes because, in the present situation, the proposed context is incorporated into the present circumstances. In this second possibility,

meaning changes because the context changes. In neither situation is
meaning indeterminate; it is determinate (even if ambiguous) because

of the context it is in.'8

But whichever way Culler uses "context"-whether as explanatory
concept or interpretive device-he goes far beyond simply showing that

"if language always evades its conventions, it also depends on them"
("CM," p. 29). What he demonstrates instead is something he admits in

a footnote: that the distinction between convention and context breaks

down (see "CM," p. 30 n. 12). Indeed, all idealist theories of interpretive
conventions tend to self-destruct when they adopt the notion of context
to solve their conventionalist problems. Do either realist or idealist uses
of conventions, then, provide a full account of literary interpretation?
The answer must be no, for both epistemological positions fail to avoid

radical embarrassments in their accounts.

Nor do theories combining realism and idealism avoid the hermeneutic
problems. Typically, such theories argue that realism and idealism are
each only partially right, that neither the text alone nor the reader alone
determines meaning, that meaning is contributed by both text and reader
This comfortable compromise is understandably popular in contemporary
theory, but it solves none of the realist/idealist problems.'9 What it does
do, however, is cagily cover up those problems by continually postponing
their discovery. In conventionalist theories, for instance, we noted how

some realists move from conventions in a text to conventions matched

in a competent critic's mind. Such theories, by moving toward idealism,
avoid the realist problem of explaining textual causation. But when those

same theories run up against the idealist problem of determining appropriate interpretive conventions in a given situation, they turn back
to the text for a solution. Thus, we end up with a cunningly circular

argument: stay a realist until you have problems, then move toward
idealism until you get embarrassed, then return to realism, and so forth
ad infinitum. No amount of tinkering or conflating can save realist and

idealist conventionalism from similar dead ends and vicious circles.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that any other accountobjective or subjective, conventionalist or nonconventionalist, or some
admixture of these-could provide a general theory of interpretation,
something we can call Theory with a capital T, something which could
solve the hermeneutic problems we have discussed in this section. As
Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels have recently shown, Theory
is impossible if it is defined as "the attempt to govern interpretations of
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particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in g
My critique of realist and idealist conventionalism is another v
the attack on Theory so defined. The solution to the realist/ideal
in hermeneutics is not, then, the proposal of still another Theo
way to answer the realist/idealist question "Is meaning created
text or by the reader or by both?" is simply not to ask it, to st
Theory.

2

The anti-Theory argument opens up two possibilities: a Theorist
can be convinced by the argument and stop doing Theory, or he can
remain unpersuaded and continue business as usual. Let's take up the
second and more likely scenario first. If Theory simply continues, what

will happen? According to Knapp and Michaels, Theory depends on
logical mistakes like Hirsch's separation of meaning from intention in
Validity in Interpretation.21 Since to see a text as meaningful is to posit an

author's intention and vice versa, a Theory built on the separation of
meaning and intention includes prescriptions-"Discover meaning by
first searching for intention"-that are impossible to follow. Thus, according

to Knapp and Michaels, Theory in its general descriptions is illogical and
in its specific prescriptions is inconsequential.
But Knapp and Michaels' thesis needs to be qualified in an important
way. Certainly they are right in claiming that Theory cannot have the
consequences it wants to have, that it cannot be a general account that
guarantees correct interpretations. It can, however, have other kinds of

consequences. For example, in advocating a search for the historical
author's meaning, intentionalists promote the critic's use of history and

biography, what formalists call external evidence. Thus, if a critic is
convinced by intentionalist Theory, her interpretive method would employ

historical and biographical as well as textual facts and thus could establish
a meaning for a text that was different from one where extratextual
evidence was scrupulously ignored.22
But such methodological consequences might not be exactly what

Knapp and Michaels mean by consequences. Fish has recently made a

related argument for Theory's inconsequentiality, an argument which
suggests that my objection is entirely beside Knapp and Michaels' point:
Interpretation is a function of the way human beings know, of what
it is possible and not possible for the mind to do, of epistemology;

and epistemology-the conditions of human knowing-is logically

independent of any account one might give of it. I could be wrong
about the way interpretation works, or I could be right; but the fact
of my being either right or wrong would have no bearing whatsoever
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on the interpretive act I (or anyone persuaded by me) might per-

form.23

In this sense, Fish would argue, accurate or inaccurate Theory has no
consequences.

I agree that having a correct or incorrect account of interpretati

neither enables nor disables the critic in doing interpretation. She interpre

in any case. But having this rather than that hermeneutic account do
affect the kind of interpretation done. One account, for example, mig
restrict the critic to the published text; another might encourage her

examine manuscript material and biographical evidence. Fish, Kna

and Michaels would not, I suppose, call these effects theoretical becau
over and above such methodological prescriptions, the Theorist claim

that the correctness of his account determines the effects it has. The

anti-Theorists argue that since this Theoretical claim can't be true, th
hermeneutic account has no methodological consequences. But delimiti
"methodological consequences" in this way is certainly misleading. Tru
Theories do not have the kind of consequences a Theorist thinks they
have in the way he thinks they have them. Still, the attempt to do t
impossible (to have a correct Theory that guarantees valid interpretatio
because it is correct) does have consequences for practice that directly
follow from the theoretical attempt, consequences such as critics talkin
about the author's mind or becoming preoccupied with biography.
This, then, is my answer to the first question, "If a Theorist continues

doing Theory, what is he doing?" If it persuades other critics, his Theo
continues to have consequences, but they are not exactly what he think

they are. He has not provided an idealist or realist account of interpretation

that can be appealed to in order to adjudicate readings. He has, howev
affected critical practice by encouraging one type of interpretive meth
rather than another. But now I turn to the second question, "What w
happen to theory if the anti-Theory argument is accepted?" Of cours
Theory would end, but what can take its place? What happens when t
theorist stops searching for that general account that guarantees corre
readings? Where does he go once he quits asking realist or idealist questi
about interpretation?
One route to follow takes a turn toward rhetoric. I take this path i
the rest of my essay, where I propose a rhetorical hermeneutics, an an
Theory theory. Such a hermeneutics does not view shared interpretiv
strategies as the creative origin of texts (in what George Orwell calls
act of "collective solipsism") but, rather, as historical sets of topics, a
guments, tropes, ideologies, and so forth, that determine how texts a

established as meaningful through rhetorical exchanges. In this vie

communities of interpreters neither discover nor create meaningful tex
Such communities are actually synonymous with the conditions in whi
acts of persuasion about texts take place. Concepts such as "interpreti
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strategies and "argument fields" are, we might say, simply tools for referring

to the unformalizable context of interpretive work, work that always
involves rhetorical action, attempts to convince others of the truth of
explications and explanations.24
A rhetorical hermeneutics must, by necessity, be more therapeuti
than constructive.25 To be otherwise, to construct a new account of inte

pretation in general, would simply reinvoke the same old problems of
realism and idealism. Rather than proposing still another interpretive

system on all fours with realist and idealist theories, rhetorical hermeneutic

tries to cure theoretical discourse of its Theoretical tendencies. It might
then, restate the critique I made in section 1: various hermeneutic accoun
make the Theoretical mistake of trying to establish the foundations o
meaning outside the setting of rhetorical exchanges. All Theories believ
that some pure vantage point can be established beyond and ruling ove
the messy realm of interpretive practices and persuasive acts. Only in
this way, it is thought, can correct interpretation, privileged meaning
be accounted for. Hermeneutic realism, for example, assumes a stabilit
of meaning before any rhetorical acts take place. Meaning is determinate
objective, and eternally fixed because of constraints in the text itself tha
are independent of historically situated critical debates. In a strangely
similar way, hermeneutic idealism also assumes stability of meaning outside
situated practices. Meaning is determinate, intersubjective, and temporarily
fixed because of constraints provided by the communal conventions in
readers' and critics' minds. When hermeneutic idealists attempt to describ
the system of interpretive conventions that determine meaning, eithe
they describe this system as independent of rhetorical situations or the
do not realize that the conventions themselves are the topic of critical

debate at specific historical moments. In either case, idealists make

mistake similar to that of realists by presupposing the possibility of meanin

outside specific historical contexts of rhetorical practices.
Rhetorical hermeneutics tries to correct this mistake, but simply
showing the problems with hermeneutic realism and idealism is not enough.

It must also explain why realism and idealism are such attractive theori
of interpretation in the first place. We can best do this by redefining

realist and idealist claims in terms of a rhetorical hermeneutics. What

exactly do these past theories teach us about rhetorical exchanges i

interpretation? The realists' claims about constraints in the text testif
to the common assumption in critical debates that interpretive statemen
are about texts. References to the text are therefore privileged moves i
justifying interpretations. The idealists' claims about the constitutive power

of critical presuppositions exemplify the common pluralist belief that i
you change the questions being asked about texts, you change the answer
you get, and if you can convince someone else to ask your questions, yo
are that much closer to convincing her to accept your interpretation
a specific text. A rhetorical hermeneutics does not reject any of these
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assumptions. In fact, it uses their widespread acceptability to explain the
rhetorical dynamics of academic interpretation in late twentieth-century
America. But to acknowledge the power of these assumptions in rhetorical
exchanges today does not entail making any claims about whether they

are epistemologically true. Such epistemological questions are simply
beside the point for a rhetorical hermeneutics. Asking them always leads
back to the dead ends of realism and idealism.

Rhetorical hermeneutics, then, gives up the goals of Theory an
continues theorizing about interpretation only therapeutically, exposin
the problems with foundationalism and explaining the attraction of reali
and idealist positions. But a rhetorical hermeneutics has more to do: it
should also provide histories of how particular theoretical and critical
discourses have evolved. Why? Because acts of persuasion always tak
place against an ever-changing background of shared and disputed assumptions, questions, assertions, and so forth. Any full rhetorical analy
of interpretation must therefore describe this tradition of discursive prac-

tices in which acts of interpretive persuasion are embedded.26 Thus rhe
torical hermeneutics leads inevitably to rhetorical histories, and it is

one of these histories I now turn.

3

Recently more and more attention has been paid to the institutional
politics of interpretation, and this attention has proven salutary for histories

of literary criticism.27 Traditional histories tended to minimize the importance of social, political, and economic factors in the development of
American literary study; the focus was almost exclusively on abstract
intellectual history. In the introduction to one paradigmatic text, Literary
Criticism: A Short History, Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks claimed to "have
written a history of ideas about verbal art and about its elucidation and
criticism," stressing "that in a history of this sort the critical idea has
priority over all other kinds of material."28 Such histories of critical ideas
not only downplayed the political and economic context in which those
ideas developed; they also ignored the effects of literary study's institutionalization within the American university of the late nineteenth
century. In a moment I will try to show how this historical event transformed

the critical tradition by adding specific institutional requirements to the
more general cultural and political determinations that affected the rhetorical shape of American literary study.
More comprehensive than descriptions of critical ideas is a newer
kind of critical history: explanations of literary study in terms of social,
political, and economic forces. In English in America, for example, Richard
Ohmann shows how "industrial society organizes the labor of people who
work with their minds"; in The Critical Twilight, John Fekete situates
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modern critical theory within the American network of social i
manipulated by corporate capitalism.29 Such studies take account of

criticism as part of a discipline which is situated within an ins
the modern university. Indeed, Ohmann, Fekete, and others ha
valuable work in revealing the institutional mechanisms that c
the development of academic literary study. But though these h
analyses do acknowledge the importance of institutional constra
determinations are secondary to their primary interest in econo
political formations in society at large. The result is that (a
Fekete's case) such accounts sometimes overlook or distort the ins
role of literary studies in the development of critical ideology.
Fekete argues that, in the modern critical tradition, "cultural me

reveals its politics directly,"30 I would say that social and political fo

reveal themselves only indirectly, through the mediation of cr
place within institutions for producing knowledge-universities g
and literature departments specifically. That is, the establishme
tenance, and development of literary study in universities can
partially explained through analysis of factors outside these ins
A more intrainstitutional explanation must also be attempted b
once the institutional space has been established for literary st
specific interpretive work and rhetorical practices within this s
only crudely affected by extrainstitutional factors.
Let me use the institutional history of New Critical forma

illustrate what I mean. Traditional accounts of critical ideas and more

recent sociopolitical analyses of criticism give a prominent place to th
hegemony of New Criticism in American literary study during the 19
and 1950s. Traditional histories of criticism usually recount the genealo
of New Critical ideas but fail to explain adequately why those ideas cam
to dominate literary study. Sociopolitical analyses like those of Ohma

and Fekete have much more explanatory power. For instance, Fek

skillfully shows how Agrarian social ideology, which attacked modern
industrial civilization, was easily accommodated to corporate capitalism
through the institutionalization of New Criticism within English
partments. Fekete's otherwise insightful analysis, however, does not gra

the institutional setting of literary study its full share in determining the

shape and hegemony of New Criticism. In fact, Fekete distorts the natu
of the institutionalized discipline when he suggests that New Criticis
filled a vacuum created in the 1930s by the failure of socialist critici
within the discipline.31 Actually, there was no vacuum: literary stud

within the academy was dominated by historical scholarship, which provide

the discipline with a professional training program, shared research goa
and interpretive conventions for viewing literature. The rhetorical sha
of New Criticism-its theory and practice-was influenced significantly
by its institutional attempt to displace this scholarship as the domina
approach to literary texts. To understand exactly what was required o
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New Criticism, we need to trace the institutional history of literary study.

In what follows I will briefly present a rhetorical version of this history,
emphasizing only those forces and events that contribute to an intrainstitutional analysis of why New Criticism achieved its persuasive authority

in the American study of literature. Such a rhetorical history follows
directly from the rhetorical hermeneutics I have proposed because, to
understand the discursive practices of interpretive rhetoric, we must also
understand their past and present relations to the nondiscursive practices

of institutions.

In the 1870s and 1880s the American university expanded its collegiate
curriculum to include scientific and humanistic disciplines previously
ignored, and it utilized the model of German scientific research for its
conception of knowledge production.32 The influence of this scientific
ideology can be seen in the particular way literary study was institutionalized. Various critical approaches were available to those in the university
who wanted literature to be made part of the curriculum-for example,
moral or didactic criticism, impressionism, and liberal social criticism.
But the approach that made possible the institutionalization was German
philology, the scientific study of modern languages and a linguistic and
historical approach to literature.33 Philology provided the scientific rhetoric

needed to justify literary and linguistic study to the rest of the academic
community. This scholarship allowed the discipline to take advantage of
all the mechanisms for the production and dissemination of knowledge
that other institutionalized disciplines were developing. Philological study
provided a methodology that could be used for the classroom practices
derived from the German scientific model: the seminar, the specialized

lecture, and the research paper. It also made use of the agencies that
the emphasis on research had created for the diffusion of knowledge:

scholarly journals, university presses, and the annual conventions of

learned societies.

But philology did not simply plug into an institutional compartment
set aside for literary studies; it also effectively designed the interior of
that compartment. In the early twentieth century, philology allowed the
discipline to develop historical scholarship in all its forms (source and
influence studies, examinations of historical backgrounds, and so forth).
Indeed, philological research provided much of the agenda for the future
of the discipline. The narrower view of philology gave literary study such
basic projects as textual editing, variorum commentaries, bibliographica
descriptions, and linguistic analyses. The broader view of philology gave
historical scholarship its most ambitious rationale: philology as "the cultural

history of a nation."34 As philology modulated into a less linguistically
oriented historicism in America, it maintained the ideal of this study of

a national spirit. Thus philology did its part for Americanism in the
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academy's cultural politics as the United States emerged a world pow
during the first decades of the century.

In the first quarter of the twentieth century, then, philological resea
and historical scholarship filled the institutional space provided for litera

studies. These communal practices shaped and were shaped by th

stitutional nature of the discipline, and the functions they served be
an important part of the institutional demands that the rhetoric of

new approach needed to address. I would now like to outline som

the ways in which New Criticism effectively served and, in turn, rev

institutional functions when it came to dominate the discipline by displac

historical scholarship.35
First of all, New Criticism provided an ingenious rhetorical acco
modation to scientific ideology. As I've noted, scientific research prov
the model of knowledge production through which literary study
several other disciplines were institutionalized. The prestige of scie

continued to grow within the academy during the early twentieth centur

but at the same time some members of the humanistic disciplines g
increasingly discontented with scientific ideology and its positivistic
sumptions. In literary study, these two conflicting trends came toge
in the way the New Critics theorized about literature and criticism in
second quarter of the century. On the one hand, New Critics defen

literature against the onslaught of positivist values by claiming that liter

discourse presented a kind of knowledge unavailable in scientific disco
On the other hand, New Criticism itself was promoted as a "scienti
method of getting at this nonscientific, literary knowledge. This stra
manipulation of scientific ideology can be seen in the rhetoric of J
Crowe Ransom. In the early 1940s, Ransom distinguished science fr
poetry, arguing that poetry recovers "the denser and more refract
original world which we know loosely through our perceptions and m
ories." Poetry treats "an order of existence ... which cannot be trea
in scientific discourse."36 Though he distanced literature from scie
Ransom advocated a closer relationship between literary criticism a
science: "Criticism must become more scientific, or precise and system
and this means that it must be developed by the collective and sustai

effort of learned persons-which means that its proper seat is in
universities."37 Here Ransom recognized the importance of proposin
"scientific" method of criticism to replace the "scientific" method of
ological scholarship dominating the discipline. In this way, New Criti
accommodated itself to the institutionally entrenched model of know
production and simultaneously provided a defense of its subject ma
as autonomous and uniquely worthy of study. It is beside the point
New Criticism actually laid claim to only a few characteristics of scien
method (technical precision, objectivity, neutrality) or that sciences

as physics were calling these scientific ideas into question. What is import

institutionally is that New Criticism rhetorically adapted to the scien
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ideology in such a way that it provided continuity as well as revitalization
for the discipline.
This revitalization included a humanistic critique of carefully chosen
aspects of scientific ideology. Some New Critics extended a humanistic
attack on scientific relativism to the scientism of historical scholarship.
In "Criticism, History, and Critical Relativism," Brooks took exception
to Frederick Pottle's historical study, The Idiom of Poetry, and was particularly

upset with the book's historicist premises. Critical evaluation is always

relative, Pottle argued, because "poetry always expresses the basis of
feeling (or sensibility) of the age in which it was written" and therefore
earlier poetry can never be judged by twentieth-century standards. "The
poetry of an age [in a collective sense] never goes wrong."38 Brooks opposed
these historicist assumptions with his own formalist claims about poetic
structures that are transhistorical: "functional imagery, irony, and complexity of attitude" can be used to evaluate poems in all ages ("CHCR,"
p. 209). Brooks argued further that a debilitating relativism would certainly

result if historical study continued to ignore the universal criteria of
formalist evaluation. "I am convinced," he wrote, "that, once we are

committed to critical relativism, there can be no stopping short of a
complete relativism in which critical judgments will disappear altogether"
("CHCR," p. 212). Attributing this growing danger to the fact that "teachers

of the Humanities have tended to comply with the [scientific] spirit of
the age rather than to resist it," Brooks argued that in literary studies
we have tried "to be more objective, more 'scientific'-and in practice we
usually content ourselves with relating the work in question to the cultural

matrix out of which it came" and thus irresponsibly avoid normative

judgments ("CHCR," pp. 213, 198). The New Critical accommodation
to scientific ideology, then, simultaneously approved one form of objectivity

and criticized another: Ransom advocated a "good" kind of formalist
objectivity in interpreting literature, and Brooks condemned a "bad" kind
of historicist objectivity in not evaluating it. In this strategic way, New
Criticism incorporated into its rhetorical appeal the strengths of both
scientific and humanistic programs within the institutionalized discipline.
New Criticism satisfied a second institutional requirement when it
became an effective means for increased specialization. The New Critical
assumption that literature was an ordered object independent of social
and historical context entailed a formalist methodology that could reveal
the unified complexity of that literary object. Since literary meaning was
also assumed to be independent of authorial intention and reader response,
New Critics stressed the details of the text in-and-of-itself. They therefore
developed their methodology by focusing on the literary text in a vacuum,
or, as they preferred to say, on literature as literature. New Critics thus
tried to elaborate a technical criticism that derived its interpretive categories
exclusively from literature and not psychology, sociology, or history. This
rejection of "extrinsic" approaches conveniently included a rejection of
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the historical assumptions of philological scholarship. The rhetoric

this new "intrinsic" criticism served the institutional function of reinfor
the independence of literary study within the academy, an accomplishme

that was part of a general institutional tendency in American univers

between 1910 and 1960. As Stephen Toulmin points out:

During those years . . . the academic and artistic professions mo
into a new phase of specialization. Each "discipline" or "professi
was characterized by, and organized as the custodian of, its

corpus of formal techniques, into which newcomers had to be initiat

and accredited, as apprentices. So, there was a general tende

for each of the professions to pull away from its boundaries w
others, and to concentrate on its own central, essential concerns

In literary study, it was New Criticism that fulfilled this institutional ne

for increasing differentiation and specialization.

A third function of New Criticism was its usefulness as a means of

further professionalization. Since institutional specialization also requires
professionalism, the discipline of literary studies also needed an approach
that fulfilled what Ohmann calls "the professional mission of developing
the central body of knowledge and the professional service performed
for clients."40 New Criticism easily satisfied both of these professional
requirements. It redefined the nature of the knowledge produced by the
discipline, moving it from the historical and linguistic knowledge of philol-

ogy to formalist knowledge about the literary text in-and-of-itself. It also
changed the priority of the discipline's practices as it moved away from
scholarship to criticism, giving ultimate value to explication of individua
texts. The formalist assumptions and textual explications presented the
discipline with a new pedagogy, one that Brooks and Robert Penn Warren'
Understanding Poetry (1938) rapidly taught to members of the profession

More slowly, these same New Critical assumptions and practices also
displaced philological scholarship as a methodology for training and
accrediting the growing number of new recruits to the profession.
The close readings of New Critical formalism represent the fulfillment
of the final institutional function I will point out. New Criticism constituted

a discursive practice for the discipline, one that could be easily reproduced
and disseminated within a growing profession. It gave the members new
things to do with old texts, using an interpretive machine that was easy
to operate without the traditional and lengthy training of philology.
Literary critics exploited this machine to fill the increasing number of
monographs and journals the expanding institution demanded.
In the 1940s and 1950s, New Critical formalism showed that it could
fulfill all the institutional demands I have outlined. It did this more

persuasively than any other available critical approach, even as it simultaneously modified these demands. Again, as with philology, the
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dominant critical practice and the institutional space were mutually defining. Today, debates in critical theory take place in terms set by New
Critical formalism: Is authorial intention relevant to correct interpretation?

Is textual meaning separate from reader response? Is the literary work
independent of historical context? But even more important than setting

the current agenda for theoretical debate is the hegemonic discourse
contributed by New Critical close readings, the detailed explications of
individual texts. It is no accident that the most popular forms of poststructuralist criticism are those that most closely resemble the interpretive

rhetoric of New Criticism, a rhetoric emphasizing the complexity of the
unique literary work. Thus, despite being constantly attacked and supposedly outmoded, formalist rhetoric still remains a dominant presence
in literary thought and critical practice within the discipline of American
literary studies.41

By presenting this schematic history, I am not arguing that intrainstitutional accounts are the only relevant narratives for understanding
the rhetorical evolution of the academic study of literature. In fact, I
believe that such histories must be supplemented by more comprehensive
analyses relating the institutionalized discipline to the sociopolitical forces
originating outside the university. By including this brief history in my
presentation, however, I do mean to illustrate how a rhetorical hermeneutics

is composed of therapeutic theory and rhetorical histories. More exactly,
such narratives are not simply added onto theory; rather, rhetorical theory

must become rhetorical history. Thus, rhetorical hermeneutics joins other
recent attempts to incorporate rhetoric at the level of literary theory and
its analysis of critical practice.42 Such attempts share a suspicion of Theory

and a preoccupation with history, a skepticism toward foundational accounts of interpretation in general, and an attraction to narratives surrounding specific rhetorical acts and their particular political contexts.
Such attempts place literary theory and criticism within a cultural conversation, the dramatic, unending conversation of history that is the
"primal scene of rhetoric."43 A rhetorical hermeneutics, then, is not so
much theory leading to history but theory as history.
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